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SHE WORKS HARD FOR THE MONEY WHEREVER SHE IS:
THE NEED TO ABANDON THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE
PRESUMPTION IN TELECOMMUNICATION
CASES FOLLOWING EEOC v. FORD
SEAN CAULFIELD*
“[T]he law must respond to the advance of technology in the employ-
ment context, as it has in other areas of modern life, and recognize
that the ‘workplace’ is anywhere that an employee
can perform her job duties.”1
I. HEIGH-HO, HEIGH-HO, IT’S OFF TO SKYPE WE GO: AN INTRODUCTION
TO TELECOMMUNICATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT’S REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION REQUIREMENT
Society’s reliance on electronic devices has left many wondering
whether technology can replace human interaction, particularly in the
workplace.2  Advancements such as the Internet have provided employees
with the option to “telecommute,” or work from home, instead of com-
muting to an office.3  Telecommunication has many benefits for both em-
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, Saint Joseph’s University.  This Note is dedicated to my wife, Kelly, who
has supported me throughout my law school career and with this publication.  I
would also like to thank the editors of the Villanova Law Review for their assistance
with the writing of this Note.  The inspiration for this title comes from the song She
Works Hard for the Money, by Donna Summer. See DONNA SUMMER, She Works Hard
for the Money, on SHE WORKS HARD FOR THE MONEY (Mercury Records 1983).
1. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) (footnote
omitted) (recognizing advancements in technology have invalidated presumption
that physical presence is essential to most jobs), vacated, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir.
2015) (en banc).
2. See, e.g., Shana Lebowitz, Why Working from Home Won’t Become the Norm Any-
time Soon, BUS. INSIDER (June 9, 2015, 12:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
working-from-home-wont-become-the-norm-2015-6 [https://perma.cc/RET3-
6UAN] (theorizing physical workplaces will not be eradicated because employees
desire face-to-face interaction).
3. See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy Mansfield, On the Increasing Presence of Remote
Employees: An Analysis of the Internet’s Impact on Employment Law as It Relates to
Teleworkers, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 233, 233 (reporting internet technolo-
gies have allowed more workers to telecommute); Dawn R. Swink, Telecommuter
Law: A New Frontier in Legal Liability, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 857, 857–58 (2001) (noting
advanced information technology is allowing Americans to work from home); Bri-
anne M. Sullenger, Comment, Telecommuting: A Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act as Technology Advances, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 537, 537
(2007) (“Countless innovations, such as closed captioning, screen readers, and
speech recognition technology, have directly improved the lives of disabled per-
(261)
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ployees and employers.4  In particular, telecommunication offers persons
who suffer from disabilities that inhibit workplace performance more em-
ployment opportunities.5
Telecommuters often experience more job satisfaction and an im-
proved work–life balance.6  Between 1997 and 2010, the number of
telecommuters in the United States increased by 4.2 million.7  Although
some courts have presumed employee productivity decreases when an em-
ployee works at home, studies have shown that working remotely can po-
tentially increase employee productivity.8
sons.  Telecommuting is yet another way persons with disabilities can benefit from
this great age of technology.”).
4. Tony Bradley, Telecommuting Is Good for Employees and Employers, ENTREPRE-
NEUR (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/217919 [https://per
ma.cc/S8V3-4BMJ]  (recognizing telecommunication lowers employee stress and
reduces employer costs).  Telecommuters enjoy fewer expenses for work attire and
travel, as well as more flexibility to attend to personal needs, such as family obliga-
tions. See Swink, supra note 3, at 861–62 (listing some benefits of telecommunica-
tion for employees).  As a result of allowing telecommunication, employers benefit
from fewer costs, improved employee productivity, and higher employee morale.
See id. at 862 (describing various benefits employers receive by allowing telecom-
munication).  One example of how telecommunication lowers costs is that employ-
ees pay for their own electricity and utilities if they work from home. See Sarah
White, Working from Home Can Benefit Employers as Much as Employees, MONSTER (Nov.
3, 2014), http://www.monster.com/technology/a/The-Benefits-of-Working-From-
Home [https://perma.cc/F3HV-JMK3] (providing quote from employer who
stated telecommunication saves money because employees pay for their own elec-
tricity and utilities).
Telecommunication also has benefits for society as a whole. See Swink, supra
note 3, at 862 (“Telecommuting also provides significant benefits to society includ-
ing reduced air pollution, traffic congestion, and energy consumption.  Taxpayer
benefits include reduced costs of road maintenance and repair and diminished
need for public transportation.” (footnotes omitted)).
5. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 537 (discussing how ability to work remotely
increases employment opportunities for persons with disabilities).
6. See id. at 547 (reporting telecommuters generally have “greater job satisfac-
tion and improved balance between work and family life”).  Studies have found
evidence of increased productivity and satisfaction when employees work from
home. See, e.g., Nicholas Bloom, James Liang, John Roberts & Zhichun Jenny Ying,
Does Working from Home Work? Evidence from a Chinese Experiment, 130 Q.J. ECON. 165,
165–66 (2014), available at https://web.stanford.edu/~nbloom/WFH.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/Y68W-4BVJ] (reporting employers with same equipment at home had
higher levels of productivity and satisfaction then those working in office).
7. PETER J. MATEYKA, MELANIE A. RAPINO & LIANA CHRISTIN LANDIVAR, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES, P70-132, HOME-BASED WORK-
ERS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 3 (2012), available at https://www.census.gov/
prod/2012pubs/p70-132.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN43-M6RU] (“From 1997 to
2010, the number of people who worked at least 1 day a week at home increased by
about 4.2 million, or from 7.0 percent of all employed people to 9.5 percent.”).
8. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 557 (“Courts presume that working from
home will result in no supervision and a decrease in the quality of work produced
by employees.  On the contrary, reports consistently have shown that companies
that have implemented telework programs experience increased productivity.”).
But see Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995) (“An
employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home, where their
2
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Telecommunication raises several legal and non-legal employment is-
sues.9  Specifically, under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), employers are required to provide reasonable accommodations to
employees who are classified as qualified individuals with disabilities.10
Currently, circuit courts are split over how to apply the reasonable accom-
modation requirement to telecommunication requests.11  Most circuits
rely on a general presumption that working from home cannot be a rea-
sonable accommodation because physical presence in the workplace is an
essential function of most jobs.12  Courts are reluctant to stray from prece-
dent and continue to honor this presumption that most jobs require face-
to-face interaction, which cannot be replaced by technology.13  Yet, the
productivity inevitably would be greatly reduced.”).  Studies have actually shown
telecommunication increases employee productivity. See, e.g., Nicholas Bloom, To
Raise Productivity, Let More Employees Work from Home, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb.
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/01/to-raise-productivity-let-more-employees-work-
from-home [https://perma.cc/7UZM-4YTD] (recognizing data showed employee
productivity was higher for employees who worked from home compared with em-
ployees who commuted to workplace with same equipment).
9. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 547–48 (discussing how working from home
creates questions about employment law in various areas, such as workers’ com-
pensation); see also Swink, supra note 3, at 858 (recognizing telecommunication will
create issues for interpretation of statutes written before telecommunication be-
came widespread).
Some of the legal issues posed by the rise of telecommunication include how
it will impact workers’ compensation, taxes, and compliance with federal statutes,
like the ADA. See KEN WINTER, VA. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LEGAL ISSUES ABOUND IN
WORLD OF TELECOMMUTING INCLUDING: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, TAX ISSUES, AND
COMPLIANCE WITH ADA AND OSHA REGULATIONS (2007), available at http://
vtrc.virginiadot.org/rsb/rsb12.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4K4-6JRK] (describing le-
gal issues resulting from telecommunication).  Further, there is a question as to
whether remote employees should be treated as independent contractors, which
could have legal implications. See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Infor-
mation Revolution and Its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of the
Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 307 (2003) (“The question of whether a
remote worker is an employee or an independent contractor has direct legal impli-
cations for employers who seek to avoid penalties and liability.”).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (stating discrimination includes
“not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee”).
11. Compare Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (creating presumption that physical
presence at work is essential function of most jobs), and Samper v. Providence St.
Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding attendance as
essential function to be “common-sense” notion), and Smith v. Ameritech, 129
F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (adopting physical presence presumption), and
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 763 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (applying
physical presence presumption), with McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120,
126 (2d Cir. 2013) (disregarding presumption of physical presence and highlight-
ing importance of true fact-specific, case-by-case analysis).  For a further discussion
of the circuit split, see infra notes 74–91 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Ford Motor, 782 F.3d at 762 (applying general rule that most jobs
require face-to-face interaction).
13. For a further discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 74–91 and ac-
companying text.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the physi-
cal presence presumption in favor of a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis in
2013.14
Recently, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.15 adopted the physical presence presumption and
granted summary judgment in favor of Ford, the employer.16  This 2015
decision illustrates how entrenched this presumption is in the current
body of ADA case law.17  Unfortunately for employees with disabilities, it
becomes increasingly difficult to survive summary judgment in telecom-
munication cases as more courts adopt this “general rule.”18  In addition,
many courts do not seriously consider the employee’s credibility during
this crucial summary judgment stage because of the tendency to defer to
the employer’s business decisions.19
This Note disagrees with the presumption that physical presence is
required for job performance because recent technological advancements
have made telecommunication a suitable accommodation for many differ-
ent positions.20  This Note urges the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to update its regulations to emphasize telecommuni-
cation requests and urges the Supreme Court to settle this circuit split.21
Part II outlines the relevant ADA provisions, EEOC guidelines, and case
law regarding reasonable accommodations for telecommunication leading
14. See McMillan, 711 F.3d at 126 (finding proper analysis was fact-specific
without presumption of physical presence).
15. 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
16. See id. at 762 (applying general rule that “in most jobs, especially those
involving teamwork and a high level of interaction, the employer will require regu-
lar and predictable on-site attendance from all employees”).
17. See id. at 761 (acknowledging many courts have agreed with general rule
that physical presence is necessary for most jobs).
18. See, e.g., id. at 762 (beginning with presumption that telecommunication is
only reasonable accommodation in extraordinary situations). But see Jeffrey A. Van
Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing
Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to
Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 574 (2000) (claiming reason many ADA plain-
tiffs fail summary judgment is because of bad lawyering, not faulty court interpreta-
tion).  For a further discussion of the circuit split and physical presence
presumption, see infra notes 74–91 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the problems associated with courts’ deference
to the employer’s business judgment in these cases, see infra notes 60–62 and ac-
companying text.
20. See Laura Shin, The 20 Most Common Work-from-Home Job Opportunities,
FORBES (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2014/04/07/the-
20-most-common-work-from-home-job-opportunities/ [https://perma.cc/S8TQ-
SBWK] (listing twenty most common telecommuter jobs, including writers and
software developers).  For a further discussion of the physical presence presump-
tion, see infra notes 74–91 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of how the judicial approach to these cases can
progress in the future, see infra notes 152–89 and accompanying text.
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up to EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.22  Part III details the facts, procedural history,
and holding of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.23  Part IV analyzes the court’s
reasoning and disagrees with the Sixth Circuit’s application of the out-
dated physical presence presumption.24  Finally, Part V concludes with the
impact of the Sixth Circuit’s decision.25
II. IT’S BEEN A LONG DAY: MAKING THE COMMUTE FROM THE ADA
TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The ADA requires all employers with more than fifteen employees to
provide reasonable accommodations to qualified employees with disabili-
ties.26  The EEOC has promulgated regulations and published guidelines
regarding employer liability under the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement.27  Working at home is a possible solution for many employees
with disabilities.28  Yet, courts’ reliance on the physical presence presump-
tion makes it difficult for employees to survive summary judgment in dis-
crimination claims against employers who do not allow employees to
telecommute as a reasonable accommodation.29
A. Managing Needs: The ADA Requires Employers to Make
Reasonable Accommodations
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA with the goal of reducing societal
discrimination against persons with disabilities.30  Title I of the ADA ad-
22. For a further discussion of the development of the law regarding telecom-
munication as a reasonable accommodation, see infra notes 26–53 and accompany-
ing text.
23. For a further discussion of the facts of EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. and the
Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, see infra notes 92–145 and accompanying text.
24. For a further discussion of a critical analysis of the Sixth Circuit’s reason-
ing in EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., see infra notes 146–82 and accompanying text.
25. For a further discussion of the impact of EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., see infra
notes 183–89 and accompanying text.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012) (defining covered entities as employers
with “15 or more employees”).
27. For a further discussion of EEOC guidelines, see infra notes 54–73 and
accompanying text.
28. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 537 (recognizing ability to work from home
increases opportunities for employees with disabilities).
29. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (beginning with general presumption that most jobs require face-to-face
interaction).
30. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 539 (describing ADA’s purpose to limit dis-
crimination against persons with disabilities).  Congress signed the ADA into law
on July 26, 1990. Id.  The ADA also benefits American citizens without disabilities.
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 845–47
(2008) (detailing benefits of ADA to third parties); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back
at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without
Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 331 (2009) (“There is also evidence that the ADA
has produced public savings by reducing disability-related public assistance costs,
thereby reducing taxpayers’ general tax burdens.”).
5
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dresses employment discrimination, stating employers may not discrimi-
nate “against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” regarding
employment.31  Under the ADA, discrimination includes denial of a rea-
sonable accommodation.32  However, an employer’s practices are not dis-
criminatory so long as the employer can prove supplying the reasonable
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.33
1. Qualified Individual
Once a plaintiff is established as “disabled” under the ADA, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving he or she is a qualified individual.34  Individ-
uals are “qualified” if they can perform the essential functions of their jobs
with or without a reasonable accommodation.35  If the employee cannot
perform the functions without a reasonable accommodation, many courts
will consider whether a reasonable accommodation from the employer
would enable the employee to perform those functions.36
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application proce-
dures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensa-
tion, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”).
32. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating discrimination includes “not making rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an other-
wise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee”).  For a
further discussion of the reasonable accommodation requirement, see infra notes
40–48 and accompanying text.  The EEOC has provided some guidance as to what
type of reasonable accommodations an employer might be required to make for
an employee, such as making facilities more accessible and job restructuring. See
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2016) (listing potential reasonable accommodations em-
ployers might be required to make).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (declaring employer is guilty of discrimination
unless employer “can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an un-
due hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”).  For a
further discussion of the reasonable accommodation requirement, see infra notes
40–48 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996), abro-
gated by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012)) (ac-
knowledging plaintiff must prove prima facie case of ADA disability
discrimination).  Disability, as defined by the ADA, includes having (1) “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
such individual”; (2) “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) “being regarded as
having such an impairment . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–(C).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (“The term ‘qualified individual’ means an indi-
vidual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”).
36. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir.
2004) (citing Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2003))
(noting employee who could not perform essential functions of position without
reasonable accommodation could be found qualified if reasonable accommoda-
tion by employer would mean employee could perform essential functions).
6
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The EEOC requires courts to apply a fact-intensive, case-by-case analy-
sis when evaluating whether a function is essential to an employee’s job.37
According to EEOC regulations, courts can look to factors such as the
employer’s judgment, consequences of the employee’s inability to per-
form the function, work experience of past employees in that position,
and the amount of time that would be spent on the function.38  Neverthe-
less, courts generally defer to the business judgment of employers to deter-
mine the essential functions of an employee’s job.39
2. Reasonable Accommodation
Employers are required to provide “reasonable accommodations” to
qualified employees to ensure there are equal opportunities in the work-
place.40  If an employer fails to reasonably accommodate an employee’s
disability, the employer may be held liable for discrimination.41  The
plaintiff has the burden of showing the employer failed to make a reasona-
ble accommodation that would have been effective in the plaintiff’s situa-
tion.42  In Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass’n,43 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that employers cannot deny rea-
37. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app. (“[W]hether a particular function is essen-
tial is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis.”).
38. See id. § 1630.2(n)(3) (suggesting factors courts can consider when deter-
mining if function of employee’s job is essential).  For a further discussion of the
factors the EEOC requires courts to consider when determining whether a job
function is essential, see infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the em-
ployer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential . . . .”); see also Mason,
357 F.3d at 1119 (“We will not second guess the employer’s judgment when its
description is job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business neces-
sity.” (citing Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191)). But see Michael Edward Olsen, Jr., Note,
Disabled but Unqualified: The Essential Functions Requirement as a Proxy for the Ideal
Worker Norm, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1485, 1503 (2015) (arguing Congress intended for
employer’s business judgment to be considered, but not dispositive).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating employers may be liable for dis-
crimination if they fail to reasonably accommodate employees).  The EEOC de-
fines a reasonable accommodation as an alteration in the workplace that provides
equal job opportunity to an employee with a disability. See Work at Home/Telework as
a Reasonable Accommodation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/telework.html
[https://perma.cc/WX7M-7T7H] (last modified Oct. 27, 2005) [hereinafter
EEOC Telework Facts] (“Reasonable accommodation is any change in the work
environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual
with a disability to apply for a job, perform a job, or gain equal access to the bene-
fits and privileges of a job.”).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating discrimination includes “not mak-
ing reasonable accommodations”).
42. See, e.g., Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating
individual with disability has to suggest accommodation and demonstrate its
reasonableness).
43. 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
7
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sonable accommodations based on past issues resulting from the em-
ployee’s disability.44
The reasonable accommodation requirement is considered one of
the most ambiguous provisions of the ADA.45  In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin
Dep’t of Administration,46 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit found the biggest challenge was defining “reasonable.”47  The
vagueness of this provision has forced the circuit courts to develop their
own interpretations, resulting in a patchwork of judicial approaches.48
3. Undue Hardship
The reasonable accommodation requirement is waived if the em-
ployer can show that providing the accommodation would constitute an
undue hardship.49  According to the EEOC, an accommodation poses an
undue hardship if the measure would cause the employer excessive diffi-
culty or expense.50  The EEOC also provides factors for courts to consider
in applying the undue hardship analysis, which include the cost of the
accommodation and the employer’s financial resources.51  In Vande Zande,
the court described the undue hardship test as a cost–benefit analysis.52
44. See id. at 1137 (“It would be inconsistent with the purposes of the ADA to
permit an employer to deny an otherwise reasonable accommodation because of
past disciplinary action taken due to the disability sought to be accommodated.”).
45. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 543 (acknowledging reasonable accommo-
dation requirement is considered “one of the vaguest provisions within the ADA”
because reasonable accommodation is not “explicitly define[d]” (citing Gabel &
Mansfield, supra note 9, at 339)); see also Developments in the Law—Employment Dis-
crimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1613 (1996) (“[T]he precise nature of a rea-
sonable accommodation is an open issue that is not resolved by the text of the
statute.”).  For a list of potential reasonable accommodations employers might be
required to make, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2016).
46. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
47. See id. at 542 (“The difficult term is ‘reasonable.’”).
48. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 543 (discussing how reasonable accommo-
dation provision has left room for judicial interpretation, which is reflected in dif-
fering opinions on whether telecommunication can be reasonable
accommodation); see also Kristen M. Ludgate, Note, Telecommuting and the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Is Working at Home a Reasonable Accommodation?, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1309, 1315 (1997) (“The ADA does not even provide an explicit definition of the
term ‘reasonable accommodation’ but, instead, lists the kinds of modifications that
may be required.”).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (stating undue hardship
exception).
50. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1) (“Undue hardship means . . . significant diffi-
culty or expense incurred by a covered entity . . . .”).
51. See id. § 1630.2(p)(2)(i)–(v) (providing factors to determine whether ac-
commodation would pose undue hardship on employer).  The factors are (1) the
nature and cost of making the accommodation, (2) the facility’s financial situa-
tion, (3) the employment entity’s financial situation, (4) the entity’s operations,
and (5) the impact accommodation would have upon the entity. See id.
52. See Benjamin D. Johnson, Comment, There’s No Place Like Work: How Mod-
ern Technology Is Changing the Judiciary’s Approach to Work-at-Home Arrangements as an
ADA Accommodation, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1229, 1236 (2015) (citing Vande Zande v.
8
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Even if a qualified employee would benefit from a certain accommoda-
tion, if the employer cannot afford it, the court will not hold the employer
liable for discrimination.53
B. Working Overtime: EEOC Creates Guidelines for the
Essential Function Analysis
The EEOC requires courts to apply a fact-intensive, case-by-case analy-
sis to evaluate whether certain functions are essential to an employee’s
position.54  The EEOC has provided regulations and other non-binding
materials to assist courts in making this inquiry.55  These non-binding
materials include enforcement guidance for the ADA’s reasonable accom-
modation and undue burden provisions and a fact sheet focusing specifi-
cally on working at home as a reasonable accommodation.56
1. Regulations
In 1991, the EEOC promulgated regulations to instruct courts in ana-
lyzing employment discrimination cases for individuals with disabilities in
the Code of Federal Regulations.57  When determining whether physical pres-
ence is an essential function of the position, courts must consider the
seven factors in Section 1630.2(n) of Title 29, including the employer’s
business judgments, written job descriptions, the consequences of the em-
Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)) (describing reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship as balancing costs and benefits).
53. See id. (citing Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543)) (acknowledging “courts might
excuse [ ] employer from compliance with . . . reasonable accommodation” re-
quirement if employer cannot afford accommodation).
54. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app. (“Whether a particular function is essential
is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis.”); see also 42
U.S.C. 12201(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than . . . the regulations
issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”).
55. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (providing guidelines for application of
ADA to employment issues).  For a further discussion of EEOC guidelines, see in-
fra notes 57–73 and accompanying text.  In 1991, the EEOC promulgated regula-
tions to direct courts in their analysis of whether a job function is essential. See
generally id. § 1630.2(n)(3) (listing factors for determining whether job function is
essential).  For a further discussion of the EEOC regulations, see infra notes 57–62
and accompanying text.  In addition, the EEOC has published non-binding materi-
als to assist courts and employers in this area. See generally U.S. Equal Emp’t Op-
portunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (last modified Oct. 22,
2002) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance], available at http://www.eeoc
.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html [https://perma.cc/ZR8W-KLCU] (pro-
viding guiding principles for courts and employers).  For a further discussion of
the EEOC’s non-binding guidance, see infra notes 63–68 and accompanying text.
56. See id. (listing principles, policies, and resources for reasonable accommo-
dation and undue hardship compliance).  For a further discussion of the EEOC
regulations and fact sheet, see infra notes 57–73 and accompanying text.
57. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (guiding courts in how to apply ADA to
employment issues).
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ployee not performing the function, and the experience of employees in
similar positions.58  Courts have interpreted these factors to mean they
should generally defer to the employer’s business judgment.59
This deference is problematic for employees with disabilities because
they may not be able to prove that they can perform the essential func-
tions of their position from home if an employer convinces a court that
workplace presence is essential.60  While the EEOC has provided seven
factors to consider, the court may also look to additional evidence
presented by the parties.61  Further, these regulations are not fully applica-
ble to telecommunication cases because they were published long before
telecommunication became an issue under the ADA.62
2. Enforcement Guidance
The EEOC published enforcement guidance (the Guidance) to clar-
ify employers’ legal obligations under the reasonable accommodation and
undue burden provisions of the ADA.63  After a qualified employee re-
quests an accommodation, the Guidance instructs the employer to engage
in an informal collaboration with the employee to find a satisfactory ac-
58. See id. § 1630.2(n)(3) (providing factors for determining whether job
function is essential).  The factors are (1) the employer’s business judgment, (2)
written job descriptions, (3) how long a job function takes to perform, (4) conse-
quences of eliminating the function, (5) collective bargaining agreement terms,
(6) experience of past employees in the same job, and (7) current experience of
employees in similar jobs. See id.
59. See, e.g., Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir.
2004) (citing Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003))
(reasoning court should not question employer’s properly enforced business
judgment).
60. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 542 (acknowledging workers “may be una-
ble to prove [ ] they can perform” jobs successfully from home if employers can
convince court attendance is necessary); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d
753, 773 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Rorrer v. City of
Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th Cir. 2014)) (finding employers can easily avoid
reasonable accommodation requirement if courts defer to employers’ business
judgments).
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (“A job function may be considered essential
for any of several reasons, including but not limited to . . . .” (emphasis added)). See
Sullenger, supra note 3, at 542 (stating courts not limited to listed factors); see also
Ford Motor, 782 F.3d at 773 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“The EEOC regulations make
explicit that we can consider relevant evidence to define the essential functions of
a job, even if the evidence is not explicitly articulated in the regulations.”).  One
commentator has described the EEOC regulations as “open-ended.” See Ludgate,
supra note 48, at 1316.
62. See Johnson, supra note 52, at 1253 (noting factors were published before
“first major ADA telecommuting case” reached circuit courts).
63. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 55 (providing guidance for
employer liability regarding ADA’s reasonable accommodation and undue hard-
ship provisions).
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commodation.64  The employer does not have to implement the specific
accommodation requested by the employee and may suggest alternate
accommodations.65
In the Guidance, essential job functions are defined as duties to be
performed.66  Despite certain court holdings to the contrary, the EEOC
stated physical presence is not an “essential function” under the ADA be-
cause physical presence is not a duty that must be performed by the em-
ployee.67  Nonetheless, the EEOC also acknowledged that employers do
not necessarily have to approve every modified schedule request.68
3. Fact Sheet
In 2005, the EEOC published a fact sheet that provides information
about how to analyze whether working at home should be a reasonable
accommodation.69  The fact sheet states the ADA does not require em-
ployers to offer all employees the option to telecommute.70  If a job re-
quires face-to-face interaction, telecommunication is not a reasonable
accommodation.71  However, if an employer allows some employees to
telecommute, the option must also be available to employees with disabili-
ties.72  Further, even if an employer does not have a telecommunication
policy, the employer may be required to provide telecommunication as a
reasonable accommodation for qualified employees.73
64. See id. (acknowledging next step after reasonable accommodation request
is interactive process between employees and employers to find suitable
accommodation).
65. See id. (recognizing employer does not have to accept employee’s pro-
posed accommodation and can suggest alternative accommodations).
66. See id. n.65 (“As the regulations make clear, essential functions are duties
to be performed.” (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2) (1997))).
67. See Johnson, supra note 52, at 1249 (“[A]ttendance . . . is not an essential
function as defined by the ADA because it is not one of ‘the fundamental job
duties of the employment position.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 55, n.65)).
68. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 55, n.65 (“[A]ttendance is
relevant to job performance and employers need not grant all requests . . . . [I]f
the time during which an essential function is performed is integral to its success-
ful completion, then an employer may deny a request to modify an employee’s
schedule as an undue hardship.”).
69. See EEOC Telework Facts, supra note 40 (providing information concern-
ing telecommunication as reasonable accommodation).
70. See id. (“The ADA does not require an employer to offer a telework pro-
gram to all employees.”).
71. See id.
72. See id. (“However, if an employer does offer telework, it must allow em-
ployees with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate in such a program.”).
73. See id. (stating telecommunication may need to be offered as reasonable
accommodation even if employer does not have telecommunication policy).
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C. Let’s Take It to Human Resources: Circuit Split over How to Treat
Telecommunication Requests
Circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether an employer may be
required to permit individuals with disabilities to telecommute as a reason-
able accommodation under the ADA.74  Although courts are required to
apply a case-by-case analysis, most rely on a presumption that physical pres-
ence is required in the workplace.75  However, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the physical presence presump-
tion in 2013 and relied solely on the facts of the case to determine
whether attendance was an essential function of the employee’s
position.76
1. The Physical Presence Presumption
The majority of case law analyzing working from home as a reasona-
ble accommodation relies on a presumption that physical presence is re-
quired in the workplace.77  Courts created this presumption before
widespread use of the Internet made telecommunication possible.78  In
1995, the Seventh Circuit established the physical presence presumption
in Vande Zande.79  In Vande Zande, a paraplegic employee was unable to
work in a physical workplace due to pressure ulcers.80  After her employer
denied her request to work from home, the employee filed a discrimina-
74. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (comparing circuit court ap-
proaches for evaluating telework as ADA accommodation).
75. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (applying general rule that most jobs require face-to-face interaction and
thus physical presence); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 55 (re-
quiring case-by-case analysis).
76. See Mary Hancock, Comment, ‘Working from Home’ or ‘Shirking from Home’:
McMillan v. City of New York’s Effect on the ADA, 16 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 151, 161–62
(2013) (recognizing some courts have started moving away from Vande Zande ap-
proach).  In 1997, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
declined to follow the per se rule because it conflicted with the required case-by-
case analysis. See id. (recognizing Hernandez court rejected Vande Zande’s “nearly
per se rule” about accommodations to work from home (quoting Hernandez v. City
of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D. Conn. 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (re-
jecting physical presence presumption).
77. See Hancock, supra note 76, at 161 (“The position the court took in Vande
Zande . . . now represents the majority view.”).
78. See generally Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th
Cir. 1995).  In Vande Zande, the Seventh Circuit relied upon a Fourth Circuit deci-
sion to state that the majority view was attendance was required in most jobs. See
id. at 544–45 (citing Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213–14 (4th Cir.
1994)) (finding generally employee needs to be at work to perform essential job
functions).  For a further discussion of the Vande Zande decision, see infra notes
79–86 and accompanying text.
79. See id. at 544 (“[A]n employer is not required to accommodate a disability
by allowing the disabled worker to work . . . at home.”).
80. See id. at 543 (describing employee’s disability).
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tion claim under the ADA.81  While the Seventh Circuit held the employer
had a duty to accommodate, it reasoned that working at home was not a
reasonable accommodation in most cases.82  However, the Vande Zande
court noted this finding would likely change as technology advances.83
Many courts have relied on Vande Zande as a general rule that physical
presence is a requirement of employment.84  Yet, since Vande Zande was
decided in 1995, technology has advanced significantly.85  Today, many
courts claim to apply a case-by-case analysis, as the regulations require,
while technically relying on the outdated presumption that working from
home is unreasonable in all but extraordinary cases.86
2. A Fact-Specific Approach
In 2013, the Second Circuit rejected the physical presence presump-
tion in McMillan v. City of New York.87  In McMillan, an employee who suf-
fered from schizophrenia was permitted to arrive late to work for
approximately ten years.88  Suddenly, the employer began voicing disap-
proval of the employee’s late arrivals.89  After the employer denied the
employee’s request to work from home, the employee sued because he
believed the accommodation would allow him to complete the essential
functions of his position.90  The McMillan court determined the proper
81. See id. at 544 (acknowledging employee filed discrimination claim against
employer because employer denied request to work from home as reasonable
accommodation).
82. See id. (recognizing employer had duty to accommodate employee in this
case).
83. See id. (acknowledging finding would “no doubt change as communica-
tions technology advances”).
84. See Hancock, supra note 76, at 161 (“The position the court took in Vande
Zande . . . now represents the majority view.”); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782
F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (applying physical presence presumption);
Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F. 3d 1233, 1238 (9th Cir. 2012)
(asserting “common-sense notion” that attendance is essential function); Smith v.
Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (following physical presence pre-
sumption); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (find-
ing generally employee needs to be at work to perform essential job functions).
85. See Ford Motor, 782 F.3d at 776 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Technology has
undoubtedly advanced since 1995 in facilitating teamwork through fast and effec-
tive electronic communication such that it should no longer be assumed that team-
work must be done in-person.”).
86. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 550 (“Although nominally applying a case-
by-case analysis, the courts adhere to the view that working from home is unreason-
able in all but extraordinary cases.”).
87. See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013) (refus-
ing to follow physical presence presumption).
88. See id. at 123 (noting employer approval of employee’s late arrivals for
period of approximately ten years).
89. See id. at 124 (describing employer’s sudden disapproval of employee’s
schedule).
90. See id. (acknowledging employee filed discrimination claim because he
believed he could perform all essential job functions while working from home).
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analysis was a fact-intensive analysis with no presumption of physical
presence.91
III. PROMOTING AN OUTDATED PERSPECTIVE: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPLIES
THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE PRESUMPTION IN EEOC V. FORD
In EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.,92 the Sixth Circuit furthered the circuit
split by applying the physical presence presumption, making it easier for
employers to prove physical presence is an essential function of their em-
ployees’ jobs and harder for employees with disabilities to request reasona-
ble accommodations to work from home.93  Yet, the Internet has made it
possible for employees to work from home without any inconvenience to
employers.94  In light of the proliferation of technology, this 2015 decision
demonstrates how embedded the physical presence presumption is in the
law and the need to overturn it.95
A. Facts and Procedure
Jane Harris, a woman who suffered from severe irritable bowel syn-
drome, worked as a resale buyer for Ford Motor Company from April 2003
to September 2009.96  Ford described Harris’s job as highly interactive,
consisting mainly of group problem-solving.97  Early in her career, Harris
earned awards for her strong work performance.98  However, during Har-
91. See id. at 126 (emphasizing importance of fact-specific inquiry without any
presumptions, like physical presence presumption).  The Second Circuit vacated
the district court’s finding of summary judgment for the employer and remanded
for further proceedings. See id. at 129.
92. (Ford Motor III), 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
93. See id. at 762 (“[I]n most jobs, especially those involving teamwork and a
high level of interaction, the employer will require regular and predictable on-site
attendance from all employees . . . .”).  For a further discussion of the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s reasoning, see infra notes 116–36 and accompanying text.
94. See Shin, supra note 20 (listing twenty most common telecommuter jobs,
including writers and graphic designers).
95. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 776 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing techno-
logical advances eliminate physical presence presumption for teamwork).  For a
further discussion of the issues with the physical presence presumption, see infra
notes 152–62 and accompanying text.
96. See id. at 758–59 (majority opinion) (detailing symptoms of Harris’s irrita-
ble bowel syndrome); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. (Ford Motor I), No.
11–13742, 2012 WL 3945540, *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2012) (providing Harris’s
dates of employment and job title), rev’d, 752 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2014), and aff’d,
782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
97. See Ford Motor I, 2012 WL 3945540, at *1 (“Ford describes the resale buyer
position as ‘highly interactive.’”); see also EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. (Ford Motor II),
752 F.3d at 636 (indicating Ford stated “essence” of resale buyer job was group
problem-solving (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated, 782 F.3d 753 (6th
Cir. 2015) (en banc).
98. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 758 (acknowledging Ford’s recognition of
Harris’s strong work performance early on in her career).
14
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ris’s last few years at Ford, her direct supervisors began rating Harris nega-
tively due to attendance and performance issues.99
On two separate occasions, Harris’s supervisors permitted Harris to
try a more flexible work schedule, which allowed Harris to “work[ ] four
10-hour days . . . and [to] telecommute as needed on her work days.”100
Her supervisors determined both of these trials were unsuccessful.101  Af-
ter these two attempts, Harris asked for the flexibility to work from home
“up to four days per week” because of her disability.102  Harris’s request
was consistent with Ford’s telecommunication policy, which stated work-
ing up to four days from home was permissible.103  Although Harris’s re-
quest aligned with Ford’s policy, in reality, Ford’s resale buyers only
telecommunicated one day per week at the most.104
Ford denied Harris’s request to work from home based on her job
description and past attendance and performance issues.105  Ford made
99. See id. (explaining Ford believed Harris’s work performance declined); see
also Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Appellant at 7,
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-2484), 2013 WL
1192686, at *7 [hereinafter Brief of EEOC] (“Notwithstanding Harris’s efforts to
keep up with her work, her supervisors repeatedly criticized her for her ab-
sences.”). But see Ford Motor II, 752 F.3d at 637, 638 n.1 (acknowledging Ford “did
not credit Harris” for time spent working outside of core business hours and recog-
nizing Ford changed performance ranking system in 2009).
100. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 759 (describing Harris’s two “Alternative
Work Schedule” periods (internal quotation marks omitted)).
101. See id.; see also Brief of EEOC, supra note 99, at *7 (“In the end, Gontko
[Harris’s supervisor] pronounced the trial a failure because Harris ‘was unable to
establish regular and consistent work hours.’”).  It is unclear whether Harris was
able to work from home during business hours. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 778
(Moore, J., dissenting).  If Harris was unable to telework during business hours,
she may not have been able to access certain information necessary to complete
her job. See id. (indicating Harris “may not have been able to access information
necessary to perform her job or to reach co-workers” outside of core business
hours).
102. See id. at 759 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. See id. at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“A comparison to Ford’s telecom-
muting policy makes clear that Harris’s initial request drew directly from the lan-
guage of that policy, which allowed for ‘one to four days’ of telework each week.”).
104. See id. at 764 (majority opinion) (acknowledging Ford’s resale buyers
generally telecommuted one day per week at most).
105. See id. at 759 (indicating Ford denied Harris’s requested accommoda-
tion).  The majority noted Harris admitted four of her ten job responsibilities
could not be performed from home, but the dissent pointed to another portion of
the record that stated only three could not be performed from home. See id. (stat-
ing Harris admitted four of her job responsibilities could not be performed from
home, “including meetings with suppliers, making price quotes to stampers, and
attending some required internal meetings”). But see id. at 772 n.1 (Moore, J.,
dissenting) (noting inconsistency with Ford’s meeting notes because another
meeting lists only three responsibilities could not be performed from home).  Fur-
ther, Harris maintained the responsibilities that had to be performed in the work-
place did not arise every day and were not urgent. See id. at 772 (acknowledging
Harris stated tasks that could not be performed at home did not arise every day or
could be postponed).
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the business judgment decision that “regular and predictable on-site at-
tendance [was] essential to Harris’s highly interactive job.”106  Ford sug-
gested two alternative accommodations: (1) moving Harris’s office closer
to the restroom and (2) assisting her in finding a new position better
suited to telecommunication.107  Harris declined both suggestions.108  In
2011, the EEOC sued Ford under the ADA, alleging Ford failed to reason-
ably accommodate Harris.109
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
granted summary judgment in favor of Ford.110  On appeal, a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and de-
cided to rehear the case en banc.111  In an 8–5 decision, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s granting of summary judgment to Ford.112
B. Complying with Precedent: Sixth Circuit Adopts the Physical Presence
Presumption in EEOC v. Ford
On appeal, a majority of the Sixth Circuit held no reasonable jury
would find for the EEOC and granted summary judgment in favor of
Ford.113  From the outset, the majority relied on the presumption that
attendance at the workplace was an essential function of most jobs.114  On
the contrary, the dissenting judges claimed the majority did not adhere to
the summary judgment standard and improperly applied the required
case-by-case analysis.115
106. See id. at 757 (majority opinion) (“Ford denied [Harris’s] request, deem-
ing regular and predictable on-site attendance essential to Harris’s highly interac-
tive job.”).
107. See id. at 760 (listing two proposed alternative accommodations).
108. See id. (noting Harris declined both proposed accommodations).
109. See id. (stating EEOC sued Ford regarding failure to accommodation
Harris).  The EEOC also sued Ford for firing Harris in retaliation against Harris
for filing the discrimination claim with the EEOC. See id.
110. See Ford Motor I, No. 11–13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
10, 2012) (granting Ford’s motion for summary judgment), rev’d, 752 F.3d 634
(6th Cir. 2014), and aff’d, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
111. See Ford Motor II, 752 F.3d 634, 649 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing district
court’s grant of summary judgment), vacated, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).  The panel found the EEOC had presented enough evidence to create a
genuine dispute of material fact regarding Ford’s alleged failure to accommodate
Harris. See id. at 647; see also Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 760 (acknowledging en banc
review and vacating panel decision).
112. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 761, 770 (finding summary judgment for
Ford); see also id. at 757 (listing eight judges representing majority and five repre-
senting dissent).
113. See id. at 770 (affirming district court’s judgment and finding summary
judgment for Ford).
114. See id. at 762–63 (concluding rule that attendance is essential function of
most jobs is “controlling” in this case).
115. See id. at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“[T]he EEOC has presented suffi-
cient evidence to dispute whether Harris is a qualified individual, either because
physical presence is not an essential function of her job or because telework is a
reasonable accommodation for her.”); see also id. (“[T]he majority refuses to en-
16
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1. The Majority’s Outdated Perspective
Through an analysis of precedent, EEOC regulation and guidance,
and a reliance on “commonsense,” the Sixth Circuit decided the physical
presence presumption was the controlling rule.116  The court applied this
approach to the facts, affirming the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment to Ford and determining a reasonable jury would not find for the
EEOC.117
First, the court determined the general rule was employees who are
not present in the workplace cannot perform any of their job functions.118
The court cited to a previous Sixth Circuit opinion from 1997,
Smith v. Ameritech,119 which relied on this presumption.120  The Ford court
found the Ameritech court had “good reason” to rely on this presumption
because most jobs require face-to-face interaction, which cannot occur
when employees work from home.121  Further, the Sixth Circuit reasoned
the physical presence presumption aligned with the purpose and statutory
text of the ADA.122  The majority referred to the ADA’s “qualified individ-
ual” definition because it emphasizes consideration of the employer’s busi-
ness judgment in determining which job functions are essential.123
Second, the Sixth Circuit decided the EEOC regulations and non-
binding guidance aligned with the physical presence presumption.124
The court concluded all seven of the EEOC regulatory factors pointed
gage in the fact-intensive, case-by-case determination required by the EEOC regu-
lations and repeatedly refuses to take the facts in the light most favorable to Harris,
as summary judgment requires.”).
116. See id. at 761–62 (majority opinion) (finding precedent, EEOC regula-
tions, and commonsense support general rule that physical presence is required in
most jobs).  For a further discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s finding of support for
the physical presence presumption, see infra notes 116–36.
117. See id. at 763 (applying general rule to Harris’s facts); id. at 770 (af-
firming district court’s judgment and finding summary judgment for Ford).
118. See id. at 761 (stating many cases have established general rule that at-
tendance is essential job function).
119. 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1997).
120. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 761 (citing Smith, 129 F.3d at 866) (finding
Smith was not extraordinary situation where working at home was reasonable
accommodation).
121. See id. (“[M]ost jobs require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction,
and supervision that simply cannot be had in a home office situation.” (quoting
Rauen v. U.S. Tobacco Mfg. L.P., 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
122. See id. at 761–62 (concluding physical presence presumption “aligns with
[ ] text of [ ] ADA”).
123. See id. at 760–62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)) (referring to ADA’s quali-
fied individual definition, which states essential functions are determined from
employer’s business judgments and written job descriptions).
124. See id. at 762 (finding EEOC regulations supported physical presence
presumption).
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toward finding attendance an essential function of most jobs.125  The
court determined most jobs would be “fundamentally altered” without at-
tendance.126  The court referred to a section of the EEOC regulations that
explained the essential functions inquiry was not meant to second-guess
an employer’s business judgment or lower an employer’s standards for
work quality.127  Moreover, the court reasoned the EEOC’s non-binding
guidance supported the presumption.128
Third, the Sixth Circuit reasoned the general approach that attend-
ance is an essential function of most jobs is grounded in commonsense.129
The court stated non-lawyers and non-judges, as well as judges from other
circuits, believe in this “commonsense notion” that attendance is the most
fundamental job function.130  The court reasoned this commonsense no-
tion is buried beneath the “record, standards of review, burdens of proof,
and a seven-factor balancing test . . . .”131
The Sixth Circuit found the general rule directly applicable to Har-
ris’s case.132  The court determined Harris’s job required “face-to-face in-
teractions” because Ford purposefully placed resale buyers in the same
building as steel stampers and only permitted the resale buyers to telecom-
mute on one set day per week if their schedule allowed.133  Further, the
court reasoned Harris’s failed telecommunication attempts indicated at-
tendance was essential to her position.134  By applying the physical pres-
ence presumption to Harris’s case, the Sixth Circuit determined Harris
was not a qualified individual under the ADA and that the district court’s
125. See id. (“[A]ll seven [factors] point toward finding regular and predict-
able on-site attendance essential.”).
126. See id. (“[M]ost jobs would be fundamentally altered if regular and predict-
able on-site attendance is removed.”).
127. See id. (“‘[T]he inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second
guess an employer’s business judgment with regard to production standards.’ . . .
Nor is it meant ‘to require employers to lower such standards.’” (citation omitted)
(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app.)).
128. See id. (“The EEOC’s informal guidance on the matter cuts in the same
direction.”).  The court also cited the EEOC’s 2005 fact sheet, which stated an
employer may deny an employee’s request to work from home if the employee’s
position requires face-to-face interaction. See id. (citing EEOC Telework Facts,
supra note 40).
129. See id. at 762–63 (acknowledging belief that attendance is an essential job
function is commonsense).
130. See id. (declaring non-lawyers, non-judges, and other circuit judges be-
lieve commonsense notion that attendance is essential function of most jobs).
131. See id. at 762 (concluding commonsense notion is that attendance is es-
sential to most jobs “[b]ut equipped with a 1400–or–so page record, standards of
review, burdens of proof, and a seven-factor balancing test, the answer may seem
more difficult”).
132. See id. at 763 (“That rule has straightforward application here[ ] . . . .”).
133. See id. (“For years Ford has required resale buyers to work in the same
building as stampers . . . .  Indeed, even those who telecommute do so only one set
day per week and agree in advance to come into work if needed.”).
134. See id. (finding Harris could not perform essential functions of her job
during previous attempts to telecommute).
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finding of summary judgment for Ford was appropriate.135  The Ford court
determined a finding for the EEOC would encourage companies to con-
strain their telecommunication policies in an attempt to avoid liability
under the ADA.136
2. The Dissent Rebuts the Presumption
The dissent argued the majority incorrectly applied the required case-
by-case analysis and failed to follow the proper standard for summary judg-
ment.137  First, the dissent reasoned the majority failed to engage in the
case-by-case analysis required by the EEOC regulations.138  The dissent
emphasized the employer’s business judgment was only one of seven fac-
tors in the EEOC’s regulations.139  If the employer’s business judgment is
controlling in these cases, the dissent pointed out that employers can eas-
ily circumvent the reasonable accommodation requirement.140  Next, the
135. See id. at 766 (concluding Harris was not qualified because attendance
was essential function of her job).
136. See id. (reasoning companies would restrict telecommunication policies
if summary judgment granted to EEOC).
The Sixth Circuit reasoned a finding for the EEOC would turn telecommuni-
cation into a weapon. See id. at 765.  Relying on the Smith court, the majority stated
the “good deed” of finding for Harris would have negative consequences. See id.
(“A good deed would effectively ratchet up liability, which would undermine Con-
gress’[s] stated purpose of eradicating discrimination against disabled persons.”
(quoting Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 868 (6th Cir. 1997)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
137. See id. at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting).  The dissent also found a genuine
dispute of fact regarding whether Ford retaliated against Harris by firing Harris for
filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC. See id. The dissenting judges also
disagreed with the majority’s statement that finding for Harris would turn telecom-
munication requests into weapons against employers. See id. at 776 (criticizing ma-
jority’s argument that finding for EEOC would turn telecommunication requests
into weapon against employers).  The dissent reasoned that providing a telecom-
munication accommodation is more than a nice gesture—sometimes the law re-
quires it. See id. (“[P]roviding telework is not just a good deed; sometimes it is
legally required under the ADA.”).  The dissent pointed out that the majority
failed to address reasons why employers might want their employees to telework,
such as motivation or downsizing the physical workplace. See id. at 777 (“The ma-
jority ignores the myriad other reasons why employers might choose to provide
telework to their employees, such as incentivizing individuals to come work for
them or reducing the size of the physical workplace.”).
138. See id. at 775 (“[T]he majority’s test is in direct tension with the regula-
tions’ insistence that the inquiry is a fact-intensive, case-by-case determination.”).
The dissent noted the regulations do not warrant an analysis based solely on the
seven factors and instead encourage a comprehensive review of the record. See id.
(pointing out EEOC regulation mentions that case-by-case analysis requires review
of all evidence).
139. See id. (“The EEOC regulations interpreting this section similarly include
the employer’s judgment as just one of seven factors courts should consider.” (citing
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3))).  The dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on Ford’s
judgment that Harris’s position required face-to-face interaction. See id.
140. See id. at 773–74 (quoting Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039
(6th Cir. 2014)) (reasoning that if courts rely on employers’ business judgments,
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dissent argued the physical presence presumption hinders this case-by-case
analysis.141  Looking at many of the cases the majority relied upon, the
dissent found these cases assumed regular attendance only meant physical
presence or dealt with jobs that required access to documents or equip-
ment in a physical workplace.142  The dissent reasoned that due to techno-
logical advancements, it cannot be assumed that teamwork must occur in a
physical workplace.143
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to apply the cor-
rect standard of review for summary judgment because it did not view the
record in the light most favorable to Harris.144  The dissent found Harris’s
testimony and the EEOC’s proposed reasons for why attendance was not
an essential function of Harris’s job created a genuine dispute of material
fact.145
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: FORD INDICATES THE NEED FOR A REWORKING OF
THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO TELECOMMUNICATION REQUESTS
In EEOC v. Ford Co., the Sixth Circuit slowed the progress of telecom-
muter law in this time of vast technological advancement.146 Ford is a
prime example of the flaws in the current judicial approach to these
employers who do not wish to grant reasonable accommodation only need to
claim particular job function is essential).  According to the dissent, the majority’s
reliance on Ford’s business judgment was improper because employers can pro-
vide self-serving testimony to the same extent as employees can. See id. at 773
(“Employers, just as much as employees, can give testimony about whether a partic-
ular function is essential that is ‘self-serving’ or not grounded in reality.”).
141. See id. (“[T]he majority’s insistence that the ‘general rule’ is that physical
attendance at the worksite is an essential function of most jobs does not advance
the analysis in this case.”).
142. See id. at 775–76 (criticizing Ford’s reliance on precedent that either as-
sumed regular attendance meant attendance at workplace or dealt with jobs that
required accessing documents or equipment at workplace).
143. See id. at 776 (“[I]t should no longer be assumed that teamwork must be
done in-person.”).
144. See id. at 771 (criticizing majority for not applying proper summary judg-
ment standard); see also id. at 773 (“[W]e must take the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant.”).  The dissent found the majority failed to look at
the facts in the most favorable light for Harris and instead viewed the record in the
light least favorable to Harris. See id. at 777 (reasoning majority “instead reads
factual disputes or ambiguity in the record in the light least favorable to Harris”).
The dissent further clarified the role of the court is not to assess who is more
credible at the summary judgment stage. See id. at 773 (“Our role is not to assess
who is more credible.”).
145. See id. (“As in any case, testimony from the plaintiff can be sufficient to
preclude summary judgment, provided that it creates a genuine dispute of mate-
rial fact.”); see also id. at 777–78 (listing reasons why EEOC created genuine dispute
of material fact regarding whether telecommunication was reasonable accommo-
dation for Harris).
146. For a further discussion of the issues with the Ford court’s ruling, see
infra notes 152–82 and accompanying text.
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cases.147  First, reliance on the physical presence presumption is out of
place in today’s society.148  The physical presence presumption improp-
erly tips the scale toward the employer from the outset.149  Second, the
Sixth Circuit did not properly adhere to the summary judgment standard,
which can be detrimental in ADA cases.150  Third, courts need to lessen
their reliance on the employer’s business judgment and focus on the spe-
cific facts of the case because the ADA already has a protection in place for
employers—the undue hardship provision.151
A. It’s Time to Fire Commonsense: Courts Should Abandon the
Physical Presence Presumption
Technology has advanced beyond commonsense.152  As the Vande
Zande court prophesized, due to developments in communications tech-
nology, the presumption that physical presence is necessary in the work-
place is no longer sensible.153  Although the Ford court reasoned this
presumption was grounded in commonsense, in today’s world, attendance
can no longer be assumed to mean presence at a physical workplace.154
Virtual technology has provided employees with the ability to perform
their workplace functions without being physically present.155  One com-
147. For a further discussion of the why the current judicial approach to tele-
communication requests see infra notes 152–82 and accompanying text.
148. See Ford Motor II, 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) (acknowledging it can
no longer be assumed that attendance is required for job performance), vacated,
782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  For a further discussion of the issues with
the physical presence presumption, see infra notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
149. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 761–62 (finding physical presence pre-
sumption was controlling rule).
150. See id. at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting) (stating majority did not properly
adhere to summary judgment standard).  For a further discussion of the Ford
court’s application of the summary judgment standard, see infra notes 163–74 and
accompanying text.
151. See id. at 762 (majority opinion) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app.)
(explaining courts’ essential functions inquiry should not invalidate employer’s
business judgment). But see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (stating employers
do not need to make a reasonable accommodation if it would be undue hardship).
152. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 537 (“Developments in technology over
the last few decades, including computer enhancements and widespread Internet
use, have changed the way society communicates and conducts business.”); see also
Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 762–63 (finding attendance is an essential job function
based on commonsense).
153. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 776 (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Technology
has undoubtedly advanced since 1995 in facilitating teamwork through fast and
effective electronic communication such that it should no longer be assumed that
teamwork must be done in-person.”); see also Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin.,
44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding physical presence presumption will
“no doubt change as communications technology advances”).
154. See Ford Motor II, 752 F.3d 634, 641 (6th Cir. 2014) (reasoning “attend-
ance at the workplace can no longer be assumed to mean attendance at the em-
ployer’s physical location”), vacated, 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
155. See id. (“[T]he ‘workplace’ is anywhere that an employee can perform
her job duties.”).
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mentator stated the physical presence presumption will become more irra-
tional as telecommunication becomes more prevalent.156
The physical presence presumption directly contradicts the legally re-
quired case-by-case analysis for at-home work accommodations.157  Courts
need to give more deference to the EEOC regulations and focus on the
specific facts of each case.158  The EEOC should discredit the physical
presence presumption in an updated version of their regulations.159  In
non-binding EEOC guidance, the EEOC has stated attendance is not a de
facto essential function under the ADA because it is not a duty employees
must necessarily perform.160  Though physical presence should no longer
be assumed to be an essential job function, courts still have the discretion
to conclude that telecommunication is not a reasonable accommodation
in any given case.161  Many jobs, such as those in the medical profession,
continue to require physical presence as an essential function.162
156. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 553 (“As more employers allow greater
numbers of individuals to work from home, a presumption that workplace pres-
ence is essential will become more and more irrational.”).
157. See Ludgate, supra note 48, at 1335 (“Not only is a fact-specific approach
to telecommuting cases more analytically sound [than the physical presence pre-
sumption], it is also the approach that the ADA requires.”).  Some courts have
reached the conclusion that the physical presence presumption violates the legally
required case-by-case analysis. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp.
125, 132 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding Vande Zande physical presence presumption
violates statutorily required case-by-case analysis).
158. For a further description of why courts are required to defer to the
EEOC’s case-by-case analysis in ADA employment claims, see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.  For a further discussion of why courts are not limited to the
seven factors listed in the EEOC regulations, see  supra note 63.  One commentator
has called for more judicial deference to EEOC interpretations of the ADA be-
cause they tend to favor employees. See Ann C. Hodges, Working with Cancer: How
the Law Can Help Survivors Maintain Employment, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1112
(2015) (“Finally, more judicial deference to EEOC interpretations of the ADA,
which tend to be more favorable to employees and less deferential to existing em-
ployer policies and work structures, would benefit cancer survivors.”).
159. The EEOC has also written guidance on the ADA’s reasonable accommo-
dation requirement that, among other suggestions, encourages an interactive pro-
cess between the employee and employer to develop a mutually acceptable
accommodation. See EEOC Telework Facts, supra note 40 (providing information
concerning telecommunication as reasonable accommodation and how to inter-
pret ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision).  The EEOC should provide a
structure for this interactive process and make it binding on employers to assist the
courts in their approach to these cases. See id.
160. See supra note 68.  For a further discussion of the EEOC’s binding and
non-binding guidance regarding telecommunication and interpretation of the rea-
sonable accommodation requirement, see supra notes 54–73 and accompanying
text.
161. See Hancock, supra note 76, at 168 (“Given that physical presence re-
mains integral to many forms of employment, a court might still determine, on a
case-by-case basis, that a disabled employee could never perform all essential func-
tions to employment without his or her physical presence at the job site.”).
162. See id. (declaring many jobs still require physical presence).  Some jobs
do not lend themselves to telecommunication. See, e.g., Samper v. Providence St.
Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding telecommuni-
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B. Working at Home Could Have Worked: The Sixth Circuit Did Not Properly
Apply the Summary Judgment Standard
As the dissent notes, the Ford majority did not view the record in the
light most favorable to Harris.163  The majority reasoned Harris’s failed
telecommunication attempts indicated presence was an essential function
of her job.164  Yet, there was a question as to whether those trials occurred
during core business hours.165  Harris’s testimony and other evidence sup-
ported the claim that Harris would be able to complete the majority of her
job functions from home.166  Further, the dissent pointed out that Harris’s
past attendance and performance issues should have had no impact on
her telecommunication request.167  Denying reasonable accommodations
because of past problems stemming from the disability is a potential viola-
tion of the ADA.168  The ADA states employers may not discriminate “on
the basis of [the employee’s] disability.”169  According to the dissent, Har-
ris and the EEOC presented enough evidence to create a genuine dispute
of material fact.170
This issue extends far beyond the Sixth Circuit.171  One commentator
has reported that, contrary to popular media portrayals, the ADA has not
cation cannot be reasonable accommodation for neo-natal nurse); see also Ford Mo-
tor III, 782 F.3d 753, 773 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Some
jobs clearly require an employee to be in the office—for example, an employee
who works in a factory and must use large immobile equipment that is located only
on-site.”).
163. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting) (dissenting be-
cause “majority . . . repeatedly refuses to take the facts in the light most favorable
to Harris, as summary judgment requires”); see also Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra
note 18, at 574 (claiming many ADA plaintiffs fail summary judgment because of
bad lawyering, not faulty court interpretation).
164. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 763 (acknowledging Harris’s previous at-
tempts to telecommute were unsuccessful).
165. See id. at 778 (Moore, J., dissenting) (indicating Harris may not have
been able to access important information outside of core business hours).
166. See id. at 772 (acknowledging Harris’s declaration contradicted Ford’s
view of her job); see also id. at 772 n.1 (noting evidence stating only three of Har-
ris’s responsibilities could not be performed from home).
167. See id. at 777 (“That Harris had attendance issues does not make her
request to telework unreasonable.  Harris missed work because of her disability.”);
see also id. at 759 (indicating Ford denied Harris’s requested accommodation).
168. For a further description of the Ninth Circuit case which found denying
reasonable accommodations because of past problems resulting from the disability
needing accommodation is inconsistent with ADA, see supra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)  (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . .”).
170. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 777–78 (Moore, J., dissenting) (arguing
Harris and EEOC created genuine dispute of material fact over whether telework
was reasonable accommodation).
171. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defend-
ants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more
than ninety-three percent of reported ADA employment discrimination cases de-
cided on the merits at the trial court level.  Of those cases that are appealed, de-
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been a “windfall” for plaintiffs.172  Many judges are deciding issues that
should have the chance to be heard before a jury.173  A reluctance to send
cases to juries can lead to a difference in outcome because juries are gen-
erally more likely to favor plaintiffs in employment discrimination
cases.174
C. Reset the Meeting Agenda: Courts Need to Lessen Their Deference to the
Employer’s Business Judgment
Although the EEOC regulations demand a case-by-case analysis,
courts have placed significant weight on the seven listed factors, particu-
larly the employer’s business judgment.175  One section of the regulations
state the case-by-case inquiry should not “second guess an employer’s busi-
ness judgment.”176  While the employer’s position must be taken into con-
sideration, if courts continue to defer to the employer’s business
judgment, an employer can merely claim a function is essential to avoid
making an accommodation.177
The ADA already protects employers from unreasonable accommoda-
tions that will negatively impact their businesses.178  The undue hardship
provision is an exception to the reasonable accommodation requirement,
which allows employers to avoid making reasonable accommodations if it
fendants prevail in eighty-four percent of reported cases.” (footnotes omitted)); see
also Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA
Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2071 (2013) (“This preliminary
trend may suggest a continuing judicial unease with disability discrimination
claims generally and with reasonable accommodation requests more specifically.”).
172. See Colker, supra note 171, at 102 (“I report my judicial outcome data,
refuting the media portrayals of the ADA as a windfall for plaintiffs.”); see also id. at
161 (“[T]here is sufficient data to conclude that the ADA has not been a windfall
for plaintiffs.”)
173. See id. at 111–12 (“[M]any of the normative questions raised by ADA
cases, such as . . . whether an accommodation is reasonable . . . should be decided
by juries rather than judges if the evidence presents a genuine issue of material
fact.”).
174. See id. at 102 (“Eisenberg has found, for example, that plaintiffs fare bet-
ter in jury trials than in court trials in . . . employment discrimination . . . cases.
Thus, a reluctance to send cases to the jury may make a difference in substantive
outcome under the ADA.” (footnote omitted)).
175. See supra note 59.
176. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) app. (2016) (“The essential function inquiry is
not intended to second guess the employer or to require the employer to lower
company standards.”).
177. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 773 (Moore, J., dissenting) (finding if
courts defer to employers’ business judgments, employers could easily avoid rea-
sonable accommodation requirement); see also Sullenger, supra note 3, at 542 (ac-
knowledging workers may be unable to prove they can perform jobs successfully
from home if employers can convince court attendance is necessary).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (describing undue hardship ex-
ception to reasonable accommodation requirement).
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will impose a severe enough burden on the employer.179  The undue
hardship provision renders considerable deference to the employer’s busi-
ness judgment unnecessary.180  The EEOC should reconstruct its regula-
tions to ensure courts balance the needs of employers and employees,
which will further the ADA’s goal of eliminating societal discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.181  Favoring employers in these cases
does not advance the purpose of the ADA.182
V. CONCLUSION: THE NEW 9 TO 5
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ford will make it easier for employers
to deny employees’ reasonable accommodation requests to work from
home.183  This ruling contradicts the purpose of the ADA, which aims to
prevent societal discrimination against persons with disabilities.184  The
179. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(1) (“Undue hardship means . . . significant
difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity . . . .”); see also Katherine V.W.
Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without
Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 275
(2006) (“The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has indicated that
telecommuting, like other accommodations, is reasonable unless it imposes an un-
due hardship.”).
Courts sometimes overestimate the actual cost of making an accommodation.
See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 555 (“[C]ourts often overestimate the actual costs of
accommodation and fail to take into account the benefits of compliance with the
requested accommodation.”); id. at 556 (“This assumption that costs will outweigh
the benefits is often made without reliable data.”).  One commentator has claimed
the reasonable accommodation requirement only imposes a minimal cost on the
employer or actually saves the employer money. See Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical
Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1674 (2000) (“Despite the dearth of
research measuring the actual costs of accommodating disabled workers, available
evidence indicates that many accommodation costs are recurrently nonexistent,
minimal, or even cost effective for the providing employers.”); see also Sullenger,
supra note 3, at 557 (recognizing telecommunication provides economic and other
benefits to employers).
180. See supra note 59. But see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing excep-
tion to reasonable accommodation requirement if making the accommodation
would be undue hardship).
181. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 560 (“Allowing broad statutory interpreta-
tions and assessing telecommuting cases on a case-by-case basis are ways in which
the court system can ensure the ADA will continue to open doors for Americans
with disabilities.”); id. at 557 (“As telecommuting becomes more prevalent, it will
open doors to allow qualified disabled individuals to hold fulfilling employment
positions that they would otherwise struggle to hold.”).
182. See Olsen, supra note 39, at 1522 (finding ADA has not succeeded in goal
of lessening discrimination against employees with disabilities partly because of
deference to employers’ business judgments).
183. See Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d 753, 762 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (applying
general rule that “in most jobs, especially those involving teamwork and a high
level of interaction, the employer will require regular and predictable on-site at-
tendance from all employees”).  For a further discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s rea-
soning, see supra notes 116–36 and accompanying text.
184. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 539 (describing ADA’s purpose is to limit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
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EEOC should update its regulations to provide courts with an unbiased
structure for interpreting employment discrimination claims, particularly
telecommunication requests.185  More circuits should follow the lead of
the Second Circuit and abandon the physical presence presumption in
favor of a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis.186  An employee in the Sec-
ond Circuit could win on a claim that the Sixth or Ninth Circuit would
barely consider because those courts would still presume physical presence
was an essential function of the employee’s job regardless of the specific
facts of the case.187  Ideally, the Supreme Court will step in to demand the
abandonment of the physical presence presumption.188  Persons who can-
not commute to physical workplaces deserve to benefit from technological
advancements and have the chance to work from home.189
185. See Ludgate, supra note 48, at 1315–16 (describing EEOC regulations as
“open-ended”).  For a further discussion of why EEOC should update its regula-
tions, see supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text.  The regulations were pub-
lished long before telecommunication became an issue under the ADA. See supra
note 62 (recognizing EEOC regulations were published before first ADA telecom-
munication case).
186. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2013)
(criticizing physical presence presumption and emphasizing necessity to adopt
fact-specific, case-by-case analysis).
187. Compare id. at 126 (disregarding physical presence presumption and us-
ing case-by-case analysis), with Ford Motor III, 782 F.3d at 761–62 (finding general
rule that physical presence is required in most jobs was commonsense), and
Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237–38 (9th Cir.
2012) (reasoning it was “common-sense” that attendance is essential function of
jobs).
188. For a further discussion of why the physical presence presumption
should be abandoned, see supra notes 152–62 and accompanying text.
189. See Sullenger, supra note 3, at 537 (discussing how ability to work re-
motely increases employment opportunities for persons with disabilities); id. at 557
(“As telecommuting becomes more prevalent, it will open doors to allow qualified
disabled individuals to hold fulfilling employment positions that they would other-
wise struggle to hold.”).
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